|
10MOSCOW184 27 JANUARY 2010
C O N
F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 000184 SIPDIS E.O.
12958: DECL: 01/27/2019 TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PHUM, PINR, ECON, KDEM,
RS SUBJECT: THE EVOLVING ROLE AND INFLUENCE OF VLADISLAV SURKOV
Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d). 1. (C) Summary: First Deputy Head of the Presidential
Administration (PA) Vladislav Surkov remains one of Russia's
most influential political officials, but his influence and
authority have recently taken a few hits. His focus, moreover,
has evolved into protecting the political system he helped
create, while at the same time implementing improvements on the
margin. A brilliant tactician with keen survival skills, he may
be latching onto Medvedev's modernization campaign as a lifeline
to maintain his importance as he sees priorities shifting around
him. Contacts in the human rights community continue to view
Surkov's co-chairmanship of the U.S.-Russia Civil Society
Working Group with disdain, but it is in our interest to take
advantage of his January 24-27 visit to the U.S. to try to "undemonize"
his view of civil society--and vice versa. End Summary.
----------------------------
Surkov's Influence Continues ---------------------------- 2. (C)
As an adviser to Putin, creator of Russia's "sovereign
democracy" concept, supervisor of the Kremlin's managed
political party system, and longtime senior official within the
PA, Surkov has demonstrated his usefulness in developing and
controlling Russia's political system. He has worked to solidify
Russia's political system primarily through his manipulation of
the national political party system, regional politics, and
media. Contacts consistently place him in the first or second
level of Russia's political elite, with Panorama President
Vladimir Pribylovskiy calling Surkov the unofficial "Deputy
Prime Minister for Parliament, Political Parties and Media."
Surkov continues to manage the political system, although with
less unilateral authority, while at the same time looking for
ways to improve it without undermining the system's stability.
3.
(C) Surkov's complex personality affects his two-pronged view of
the U.S., which consists of envy mixed with contempt. He told
Ambassador Beyrle last July that he considers himself an
Anglophile who enjoys American poetry; he claimed that in 2006
he predicted to disbelieving Kremlin colleagues that
then-Senator Obama would become President. Judging by
interaction with U.S. officials, Surkov can be charming in
meetings, works late into the evenings, and engages deftly,
albeit sometimes off-the-cuff, on a variety of topics. Director
of the New York office of the Russian Institute of Democracy and
Cooperation Foundation Andranik Migranyan privately told us that
Surkov had asked him to buy numerous U.S. rap albums for him
whenever Migranyan traveled to Moscow. Surkov admires the U.S.
as a "generous and humane country," and a model for Russia, but
he has also blamed U.S. stereotypes and "internal enmity" toward
Russia for the suspicion that had strained the relationship. He
told the Ambassador that if the U.S. was serious about wanting a
strong, prosperous Russia, the two countries should embark on
significant, joint economic initiatives and the sharing of
technology.
4.
(C) At the same time, Surkov continues to publicly and privately
criticize U.S. policies for damaging the relationship. He
congratulated a group of pro-Kremlin (and de facto Surkov-led)
Nashi youth members last fall for their opposition to U.S.
missile defense, and said that their actions were the reason
Washington had decided to change its policy. He complained that
the bilateral relationship is harmed by "U.S. policies" such as
encirclement, nuclear superiority, and U.S. special services
support to separatists in the North Caucasus (Surkov's heritage
is Chechen). Surkov has also told us that Russians seek to be
viewed as equals with Western partners, and that a belief exists
in Russia that regardless of rhetoric and bilateral agreements,
Washington's main goal is to weaken Russia. 5. (C) Surkov
appears to maintain a high regard for his intellectual
capabilities, which have served him well as a political adviser
and manager. United Russia adviser, sociologist, and Director of
the Center for the Study of Political Elite Olga
Kryshtanovskaya, who has known Surkov since the early 1990s,
privately told us January 12 that even at that time Surkov
viewed himself as an unrecognized genius. Perhaps as a
reflection of his self-perception, Surkov keeps photos of
several pioneering individuals displayed in his office,
including rapper Tupac Shakur, John Lennon, Neils Bohr, and
Werner Heisenberg. Last year he added a portrait of President
Obama, explaining that he was a "good American"--i.e., one who
shows respect for Russia. MOSCOW 00000184 002 OF 003
--------------------------------------------- ------
Influence Over United Russia Diluted Under Medvedev
--------------------------------------------- ------ 6. (C) With
Russia's political ideology crafted and the system relatively
stable, Surkov's function as the undisputed creator and manager
of the political system has weakened. His ability to control the
day-to-day functions of the pro-Putin, ruling United Russia
party over the last year has increasingly been challenged by
others. Kryshtanovskaya said that Surkov was losing out to
United Russia Supreme Council Chairman Boris Gryzlov, United
Russia Presidium Secretary Vyacheslav Volodin, and groups of
"siloviki" over decisionmaking within the party. For example,
Surkov fought to preclude United Russia's use of "Conservative"
when the party introduced the paradoxical "Conservative
Modernism" in November as its new ideology. Additionally,
Aleksey Mukhin of the Centre for Political Information told us
on January 13 that PA Head Sergey Naryshkin was attempting to
transfer Surkov's domestic regional politics portfolio to PA
Aide Aleksandr Abramov because Surkov had initiated rumors late
last year that Naryshkin would be fired. 7. (C) Compared to two
years ago, Surkov's evolving role has diminished his authority
within the elite. Experts have told us that Surkov is no longer
as needed by Medvedev or Putin as he once was, since the
political system now has a stronger foundation. Medvedev has
used Surkov in other capacities, such as fostering modernization
and as head of the U.S.- Russia Civil Society Working Group--an
appointment that Surkov claimed to us was a surprise. Yuriy
Dzhibladze of the Center for Human Rights and Democracy, who sat
on the Surkov-chaired working group for improving NGO
legislation, told NSC Senior Director Michael McFaul on January
14 that Surkov immediately disregarded 70 percent of the working
group's suggestions. Dzhibladze said that Surkov was dismissive
of civil society activists during the meetings, and that he
presented only "extremely minor" recommendations to Medvedev in
order to demonstrate that he was working effectively on
Medvedev's tasks. Dzhibladze also said that Surkov began
meetings of the NGO law working group with a warning on the
evils of a Ukrainian style "Orange Revolution" in Russia.
8.
(C) Surkov's influence stems from his longstanding ties to
Putin, ruthlessness, and formidable intellect, but his lack of a
strong organizational base within the elite makes his situation
less stable. Experts told us that Surkov was a man between
camps, whom people feared to remove, and did not fully trust.
Surkov had done little to build a powerful, identifiable team
around himself, lacked the support and resources of big
business, and probably will continue to rely upon his experience
and confidence in himself to have a seat at the table.
-----------------------------------
Modernization as Fallback Position?
-----------------------------------
9.
(C) Facing an evolving role and criticism of his "sovereign
democracy" ideology, Surkov appears to be latching onto
modernization to maintain his standing. In early January, former
Prime Minister Yevgeniy Primakov criticized Russia's political
party system, and specifically United Russia's "ideologically
omnivorous nature," as detrimental to Russia's democratic
development. While Medvedev and Putin strongly defended the
political status quo during a State Council meeting January 22 (septel),
Surkov has perhaps hedged his bets and added a leading role in
Medvedev's main domestic policy platform to assure himself a way
to remain powerful within the elite. As one of Medvedev's
deputies on his Modernization Committee, as well as in public
comments and in talks with post, Surkov has played that role by
emphasizing that developing a technologically and
economically-advanced, prosperous Russia is vital to the
country's future. (Note: It is widely believed that Surkov
drafted large sections of Medvedev's foundational modernization
document "Forward, Russia." End Note.)
------------------------------
Interacting With Civil Society ------------------------------
10.
(C) Leading human rights activists told us January 14 (septel)
that they continue to view Surkov's leadership of the
U.S.-Russia Civil Society Working Group as a major hindrance to
a serious bilateral discussion of civil society, without
suggesting whom Medvedev might choose as an alternative to
represent Kremlin views. Lyudmila Alekseeva MOSCOW 00000184 003
OF 003 of the Moscow Helsinki Group and NGO Civil Assistance
leader Svetlana Gannushkina both rhetorically asked post and
U.S. officials whether the U.S. could remove him and select a
different Russian interlocutor. 11. (C) Other contacts, however,
suggested that increased interaction, experience in America, and
a show of goodwill by the U.S. might cause Surkov to
second-guess his "instinctual need" to disrupt civil society
activities. Public Chamber member and television personality
Nikolay Svanidze told us that regardless of Surkov's background
and reputation, engaging him on civil society was better than
nothing, and at least provided a forum for discussing issues.
Kryshtanovskaya also told us that Surkov poorly understood
America and American values, and that more frequent visits to
America and exposure to U.S. officials would expand his world
view. -------
Comment -------
12.
(C) Surkov remains an influential figure with access to the
highest levels of Russia's government. His role on the Civil
Society Working Group should facilitate significant
government-to-government interaction, while possibly hindering
development of real NGO-to-NGO contacts. Surkov, at least at
this point, is engaging with his U.S. counterparts. We should
aim to use his upcoming visit to the U.S to try to redress at
least some of his misconceptions and steer him toward a more
pragmatic view of the possibilities for U.S.-Russian engagement.
But we should remain mindful of a frank assessment offered by
human rights ombudsman Vladimir Lukin: "Surkov wears many
masks." End Comment. Beyrle
|
